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Abstract
This article examines how individuals are reflexive beings who interpret the world 
in relation to things that matter to them, and how charitable acts are evaluated and 
embedded in their lives with different degrees of meaning and importance. Rather than 
framing the discussion of charitable practices in terms of an altruism/egoism binary or 
imputing motivations and values to social structures, the article explains how reflexivity 
is an important and neglected dimension of social practices, and how it interacts with 
sympathy, sentiments and discourses to shape giving. The study also shows that there 
are different modes of reflexivity, which have varied effects on charity and volunteering.
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Résumé
L’article examine en quoi les individus sont des êtres humains réflexifs qui interprètent 
le monde en relation aux choses qu’ils jugent importantes, et comment les pratiques 
de la charité sont évaluées et imbriquées dans leurs vies à des degrés divers de 
signification et d’importance. Plutôt que de cadrer la discussion des pratiques 
charitables en termes d’opposition binaire altruisme/égoïsme ou encore d’imputer 
les motivations et les valeurs aux structures sociales, l’auteur examine en quoi la 
réflexivité est une dimension importante et négligée des pratiques sociales, et 
comment elle interagit avec la sympathie, les sentiments et les discours pour donner 
forme à l’acte charitable. L’étude montre aussi qu’il y a différents modes de réflexivité, 
qui ont des effets divers sur la pratique de la charité et le volontariat.
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How does personal reflexivity mediate between structure and agency in shaping charita-
ble giving? Individuals are reflexive beings, who interpret the world in relation to things 
that matter to them, deliberating and prioritizing elements of their life that are of key 
concern, such as physical well-being, practical worldly achievements, family happiness, 
emotional relationships, social self-esteem, political and moral values, and faith (Archer, 
2012: 102–111; Taylor 1989: 62–63). The article will argue that people make evaluative 
decisions about charitable giving based on their concerns and life situations (Stirling, 
2010). It will also discuss how gendered roles, moral individualism and class subjectivi-
ties can shape practices of giving.
Archer (2003: 135–150) argues that first-person reflexivity is indispensable, enabling 
individuals to navigate their way through the world. People have internal conversations 
to discern things of importance, to dedicate themselves to their goals and to design 
courses of action. Internal conversations consist of various mental activities, including 
prioritizing goals, planning the day or week, having imaginary conversations, rehearsing 
speeches and performances, re-living past periods and events, imagining the future, 
mulling over problems, and clarifying issues and situations. People assess what social 
factors constrain and enable their life projects in a world not of their making, how much 
endurance is needed to stay the course and what to do next (Archer, 2000: 230–241). 
Reflexivity is personal and subjective, and has causal powers. It is also about real things, 
deliberating (always fallibly) about social relations and objective powers that affect indi-
viduals’ goals (Archer, 2007: 15–16).
Porpora (1989) argues that much of contemporary sociology tends to conflate the 
distinct properties and powers of structure and agency to produce reductionist theoretical 
frameworks. For instance, in Bourdieu’s (1990) account of social practices, the key con-
cept of habitus conflates structure and agency, as it is both structured and structuring, a 
product of social structural position, and it shapes thoughts and actions. Habitus consists 
of durable dispositions (i.e. ways of acting, seeing and making sense of the world) that 
operate below the level of consciousness. Actors operate according to an implicit practi-
cal logic and a ‘feel for the game’ that enable them to deal with a wide variety of situa-
tions in predictable ways without consciously thinking about rules. Yet Bourdieu also 
maintains that actors strategize in the social field, which surely requires reflexivity, 
though Bourdieu tends to evade this implication. There is also a tendency in Bourdieu’s 
work to assume an ontological complicity between habitus and field, implying a high 
degree of adaptability on the part of the subject. But as Sayer (2005: 35) notes, this 
means that actors become skilled at playing games rather than evaluating them, and they 
want the world and its games to be different. Internal conversations make sense of peo-
ple’s relationship to the world, which is not simply one of accommodation but also of 
resistance. They are able to imagine and desire a different world.
Furthermore Sayer (2005: 42) argues that, while Bourdieu provides an insightful 
understanding of how people judge themselves and others, and the practices and objects 
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associated with them, their evaluations are strategic, functional and aesthetic rather than 
ethical. Bourdieu’s treatment of disinterested moral judgements has been criticized as 
inadequate and problematic (Lamont, 1992). Despite warning his readers not to misread 
him as offering a reductionist, economistic and cynical narrative of symbolic exchanges, 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ loom large in his work (Bourdieu, 2000: 191–202). Caillé 
(2001) argues that, although Bourdieu becomes preoccupied with the issue of disinterest-
edness as a possibility, there is little real change in his theoretical vision, because disin-
terestedness is still conceived as merely illusory. Moreover, as Sayer (2010) maintains, 
moral judgements are distinct from aesthetic and practical ones, because morality has 
universalizing qualities that cut across class boundaries.
Philanthropic studies also tend to conflate structure and agency, producing reduction-
ist accounts of charitable giving where social and cultural structures determine actors’ 
thinking and practices (see Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011 for a review of the literature). 
Pro-social behaviours motivated by empathy, altruism and generosity are sometimes 
imputed to class structures. For instance Collins and Hickman (1991) argue that the 
major reward the upper classes receive in participating in the voluntary sector is the cul-
tural status of being a known altruistic person. Charitable giving allows the upper classes 
to legitimize their high social status. Ostrower (1998) identifies how rich donors’ atti-
tudes and practices at philanthropic events reinforce class boundaries, so that elite phi-
lanthropy produces class cohesion. Breeze (2013) suggests that giving is not shaped by 
recipients’ needs but by donors’ tastes and preferences, which are acquired as a result of 
socialization and lifelong experiences, such as family and social upbringing, education 
and social networks. Working-class donors may refuse to support charities that promote 
social causes and cultural activities (such as opera and ballet) that are incongruent with 
their identity, and that they perceive to be relevant only to other classes. But as a result 
of embedding charitable giving in class structures, these studies tend to deny actors the 
powers to think and act independently of their class positions.
The present article has five sections. The first section will examine the different ways 
in which reflexivity can mediate structure and agency. In the second section, I will 
describe the research design and methods. The third section will discuss the findings on 
how the different modes of reflexivity shape giving. I will address some possible criti-
cisms of the study in the fourth section. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks.
The three-stage model of reflexive donors and volunteers
In explaining social practices, critical realists (such as Fairclough & Fairclough, 2010; 
Porpora, 1989; Sayer, 2005) acknowledge both the effects of pre-existing social struc-
tures (e.g. class-based life chances, gender roles, social norms, organizations and dis-
courses) and the ability of actors to intentionally bring about change in light of their 
personal concerns and goals. Archer (2007: 5–22) develops this view to argue that the 
two separate entities of structure and agency are mediated by personal reflexivity, so that 
courses of action are produced through reflexive deliberations of agents, who subjec-
tively (and always fallibly) determine their life goals and projects in relation to their 
objective circumstances. The standard two-stage model of structure and agency is 
rejected in favour of the three-stage model, in which internal conversations mediate the 
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impact of social structures on agents’ concerns and condition individual responses to 
particular social situations. Without reflexivity there would be no explanation of what 
people actually do and how they modify their projects in terms of contextual feasibility. 
Reflexivity enables people to accept, evade or resist social expectations, to negotiate 
clashing expectations and to deal with contingencies.
Archer (2012: 12–41) further argues that, even though reflexivity is a regular exercise 
of the mental ability shared by all people (with some exceptions), it is exercised in dif-
ferent ways depending on the relations people establish with their social contexts and 
their dominant concerns. Her empirical studies (2003, 2007, 2012) identify four modes 
of reflexivity. First, communicative reflexivity refers to internal conversations that need 
to be completed and confirmed by others before they lead to courses of action. Second, 
autonomous reflexivity is characterized by self-contained inner conversations that lead 
directly to action. Third, meta-reflexivity is exercised by individuals who are critically 
reflexive about their own internal conversations and the prospects of effective action in 
society. Whereas autonomous reflexives are primarily reflexive about the means to their 
ends, where their ends are not problematized, meta-reflexives worry about what their 
ends should be. Fourth, fractured reflexivity is exercised by individuals who cannot con-
duct purposeful internal conversations and thus cannot design effective courses of action.
While people engage in one or more modes of reflexivity over the course of their 
lives, Archer (2007: 90–99) argues that they tend to establish a dominant mode of reflex-
ivity that collectively contributes to the structuring of society. Individuals whose internal 
dialogues are predominantly characterized by communicative reflexivity have key fea-
tures of contextual continuity and social stability that cement social relationships and 
local networks. As communicative reflexives require others’ input to complete their 
deliberations, they tend to have strong familial and social ties and to stay put in the local-
ity, collectively contributing to social stability and value consensus. It is their relation-
ships that matter most to them, whether at home, university, work or elsewhere (Sayer, 
2009). While people who largely have autonomous reflexive internal conversations also 
exercise communicative reflexivity and accommodate the interests of others, they are 
oriented towards practical worldly outcomes, self-development and enterprise. Their 
practical activities involve extensive solitary practice and reflexive monitoring. Their 
key features are contextual discontinuity and social mobility, which together produce 
social dynamism and productivity. In contrast to autonomous reflexives’ self-confidence, 
individuals who predominantly exercise meta-reflexivity are self-critical and tend to be 
preoccupied with the moral worth of their projects and their worthiness to undertake 
them (Scambler, 2012). Meta-reflexives’ key features are contextual incongruity and 
social change, which collectively contribute to social criticism and activism. Not surpris-
ingly, as moral critics, they are likely to be more involved in civil society than others. 
People whose internal dialogues are dominated by fractured reflexivity lack the stability, 
self-esteem and vision of other reflexives, and are unable to purposefully plan their life 
projects. They are inclined to be socially passive and disoriented as a result of unsuccess-
ful reflexive deliberations.
Since the 1980s, charity and voluntary action have become more widespread, partly 
reflecting a neoliberal strategy to reduce state responsibility for the provision of public 
goods. There are over 191,000 registered charities in the UK (Mohan & Breeze, 2016: 6). 
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But who participates, and why do they donate to or join one organization rather than 
another? Archer (2007: 311–313) believes that only meta-reflexives are committed to the 
voluntary sector, and that other groups are unresponsive and passive. She (2007: 282, 
298) argues that communicative reflexives tend to be uninterested in joining in social 
activities outside their circle of friends, and are indifferent towards civil-society organi-
zations, and that autonomous reflexives are too preoccupied with their own solitary prac-
tices to participate in charities.
While this article will use Archer’s ideas on reflexivity, it will challenge her claims 
about who participates in civil society. I will maintain that communicative reflexives can 
regard charities as an opportunity to do good work with and for significant others and to 
affirm communal values. Their sympathy and compassion beyond their micro life-worlds 
of intense relationships are likely to be restricted to familiar groups and causes. 
Autonomous reflexives can obtain personal pleasure from their charitable performances 
and achievements. Charities and associations also have an instrumental value, helping 
them to pursue practical worldly outcomes. Meta-reflexives are often sensitive to issues 
of fairness, justice and suffering. They breathe life into political parties and faith-based 
organizations, and participate in civil society, in the hope of bringing about change. 
Fractured reflexives tend not to engage in voluntary giving and action, because they are 
unable to successfully deliberate on charitable giving.
Research design and methods
Between 2008 and 2009, I conducted in-depth interviews with 41 individuals from a 
range of occupations, including public-sector administrators, university lecturers, social 
care workers, home-keepers, self-employed workers, mature students and retirees. Most 
of the interviews were conducted in Kent, UK. Many interviewees were recruited through 
mass emails to several local public and charity organizations, asking for volunteers to 
participate in a research project on giving and volunteering. All those who responded 
were subsequently interviewed. Several interviewees known to me were approached in 
order to have more ‘black’ and middle-class donors in the sample. As one of the aims of 
the research was to delineate a new mechanism of reflexivity that operates in social life, 
the sample was skewed towards donors and volunteers who possibly have reflected on 
giving more than others, and had more to say about it.
The semi-structured interviews consisted of two parts, lasting on average two and a 
quarter hours. The first part asked the interviewees to recount their life history, describing 
their life from their early upbringing and schooling through to their current family and 
work situation, their personal goals and routines. Interview questions included: Can you 
please tell me something about yourself from childhood and schooling to adult life? What 
were the important events or who were key people in your life? Can you please describe 
your typical day and week? Typically over a month or a year, can you say what do you do 
together with your neighbours / people on your street / members of the local community? 
Or maybe what you do for them? This part of the interview aimed to grasp how the inter-
viewees understood and interpreted their own life; more specifically, what were their key 
concerns, what were they attentive to, how did these things change over time, and how 
were charitable acts embedded into their daily, weekly or monthly routines.
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In the second part, interviewees were asked to recall their acts of giving and volun-
teering, and to describe their feelings and motivations. Interview questions included: 
Recall an incident when you gave money or time to a charity, a cause or someone to 
help out, talk me through how it began, what were you thinking and feeling. What were 
the reasons and motivations for this particular action and its timing? Can you say 
something about whether your friends, family members and work colleagues give 
money or volunteer? Of the money and time you have given to things, causes or peo-
ple, which one has meant the most and the least to you? Can you say why giving or 
helping out matters to you? This part of the interview aimed to grasp how charitable 
acts are understood and interpreted, what reasons and motivations were given for them, 
and how other people shaped their donations. Overall, a picture emerged of how inter-
viewees navigated their way through the world, being attentive to things of impor-
tance, to their well-being, and to what extent charitable giving was a meaningful and 
significant activity in their lives.
The interviewees were assigned a social class using multi-dimensional criteria: 
social-class upbringing (working- or middle-class parents), educational qualifica-
tions (school, college or university), occupation (unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled or 
professional) and household economic situation (struggling to make ends meet, man-
aging to cope or having a comfortable lifestyle). In addition some interviewees 
defined themselves into a particular social class. Based on the interview data, the 
sample consisted of 19 working-class people, 16 lower-middle-class and six 
upper-middle-class.
In terms of gender composition, 25 women, 15 men and one transgender person par-
ticipated in the research. The sample also consisted of five ‘black’ interviewees (three 
British Asians, one African immigrant and one Iranian immigrant) and three ‘white’ 
immigrants (one Argentinean, one Greek Cypriot and one South African). The rest were 
white British. The study also had seven retirees, of whom one was a part-time lay clergy 
and three were involved in managing local civic associations (a table-tennis club, a 
residents’ housing association and a naval heritage charity). There were two young 
undergraduates just about to complete their degrees. Most interviewees were young or 
middle-aged adults, and a few were approaching retirement.
All interviews were digitally recorded, and interviewees were reassured about confi-
dentiality and anonymity. The interviews were transcribed, and then the transcripts were 
returned to them for checking and editing. Only a few made slight alterations to the text, 
correcting minor factual details. The subsequent analysis was coded using various 
labels, which emerged after reading the transcripts a couple of times. Some labels, such 
as ‘giving money’, ‘giving time’, ‘values’, ‘faith’, ‘tithes’, ‘caring for others’, ‘charac-
ter’, ‘reflections upon giving’, ‘informal giving’ and ‘why giving matters’, identified 
key themes shared across the transcripts. Other labels, including ‘justice’, ‘activism’, 
‘strategic giving’, ‘self-interest’, ‘family and children’ and ‘sympathy’, were more evi-
dent in some transcripts than others. Categorizing interviewees into different modes of 
reflexivity was done in a looser way than Archer explicitly specifies, based on a close 
reading of the transcripts and an understanding of how interviewees had navigated their 
way through the world. I did not use her Internal Conversation Indicator (ICONI) ques-
tionnaire to help me to categorize them.
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Reflexivity and charitable giving
This section will discuss how individuals with different dominant modes of reflexivity 
give to charitable organizations. However, fractured reflexivity is excluded from the 
analysis, because there were no individuals with predominantly fractured reflexivity in 
the sample.
Communicative reflexives: Sociality and power
Twelve interviewees were identified as exercising largely communicative reflexivity, 
though its predominance varied among them. In several cases the communicative 
reflexives’ lived experience centres on caring and supporting children and elderly par-
ents, and their personal identity is closely aligned to other people’s lives (Archer, 2007: 
165–180). As a mother of two growing children, Mary, a former lower-middle-class 
legal secretary and now a part-time mature student, is busy with her children’s school 
runs and family visits:
I normally get up about 6, go for a run with the dog, come back, get the kids all sorted out, get 
their breakfast sorted out. I always like to give them a cooked breakfast, so I give them a cooked 
breakfast. While they’re eating that I go up and get showered, get changed, go down, take them 
to school, come [to the university], pick them up from school, start the dinner, take the dog for 
another walk, just do their homework. … I’ve got into the habit of coming to the university to 
sit in the library and do work because I found staying at home I ended up cleaning the house 
until 11.30 then I’d be hungry or might start get on the phone to somebody, so I was doing 
absolutely nothing to do with college work so if I’m out the house I actually crack on and get 
on with it. … Since the mid-term break, I’ve been just catching up with friends and I had both 
of my sisters over and they all stayed at Mum’s so I was down there every day, taking them out 
here, there and everywhere, so that’s three weeks of holiday.
Although Mary enjoys studying, it is not always a priority and has to fit into her hectic 
domestic schedule. Being a local part-time student allows her to be at university without 
having a negative impact on her family life. Some single parents have an intense rela-
tionship with their children. For instance, since her divorce, Jane, a working-class mature 
student, has developed a strong emotional attachment to her children:
We are very much together, and I love it, you go in and you go through the front gate and we 
are in our world. Me and the girls and sometimes children’s friends will come round but not that 
often and I love that, our little island. And it’s really quite nice, anti-social but it’s nice when we 
do want we want to do, because they are my little friends, really. So we are quite a little unit.
Jane is comfortable in her micro life-world, and values her relationship with her 
daughters. She is also cognizant that her daughters will leave home to study at university 
in the near future, and she will be alone. Attending a local university allows her to pursue 
her studies without severely affecting her family life.
There are two key interrelated elements of the communicative reflexives’ charitable 
giving. First, it tends to reinforce personal and social relationships, and not to be disrup-
tive of a settled way of life (Eckstein, 2001). During the summer, James, a working-class 
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estates supervisor, and his wife enjoy going to private gardens, especially those that sup-
port the Macmillan Cancer Support charity:
Macmillan Nurses we’ve always supported them because we go to the open gardens in the 
summer. … So it’s called ‘The Yellow Garden Scheme’, and the gardens are open, we’re lucky 
in Kent ‘cause there’s lots of them. So you go to a garden, it might cost you £2.50 to go in and 
you can also then buy teas and coffees and cake inside. What usually happens is the garden has 
to give a certain amount to Macmillan Nurses.
Visiting private gardens enables James and his wife to combine a family outing with 
charitable giving. As a result of buying tickets to the gardens, their visits contribute to 
charity. The Macmillan charity also has a special significance for James because it 
cared for his dying brother. James’s visits to charity gardens help to sustain family 
connections.
Some communicative reflexives view charities as an opportunity to socialize with 
others. For instance, Mary enjoys charity runs because they are an excuse for getting 
together with family and friends:
I always do a run for charity – part of that is fun as well because alright you are raising money 
for a good cause so that’s fantastic and everything, but y’know there would be a group of us 
running together, and we’d have a picnic in the park afterwards and, so it’s a social thing as 
well, so it’s not really a hardship. Sometimes it’s an excuse to do something, maybe we 
wouldn’t go for that run unless it was for a charity thing, … So it’s an excuse really to do 
something quite fun.
While Mary’s charity run will raise money for a good cause, it is also a social gather-
ing that she shares with significant others. Without the social dimension, she and other 
communicative reflexives might possibly be less motivated to participate in charitable 
events. People’s moral motivations are rarely purely altruistic or self-interested, but 
rather mixed, part intrinsic, part instrumental (Sayer, 2010). Mixed motivations are 
quite common to all donors, and for some it is connected to improving their career pros-
pects. Madeleine, a lower-middle-class estate agent, participates in a local Scout group 
to strengthen her curriculum vitae, and from a moral stance to help children from bro-
ken families:
It’s a fairly sort of some selfish motives for doing it. It would look good on my CV, which is 
one of the reasons for starting it, if I wanted to do that kind of career. Secondly, I genuinely 
think I can give children other experiences that they wouldn’t necessarily have and be a benefit 
to them. And I was just saying to my hairdresser before I left [to come here for the interview] 
that a lot of mothers always feel guilty that you’re not doing enough for your children or you 
look back at past events. I mean I was depressed for a number of years and probably wasn’t the 
best mother in the world, and I’m thinking maybe I can make up the shortfalls that I had with 
my children with other children that will somehow compensate.
In addition to having mixed sentiments of self-interest and compassion, Madeleine also 
has a strong emotional and sympathetic connection with other mothers, who like herself 
have to raise children in difficult personal and economic conditions. Smith (1976, VI.ii: 1–3) 
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notes that sympathy and a feeling of moral responsibility are easier to elicit the closer others’ 
situations are to one’s own. Note also how Madeleine discusses her situation with her hair-
dresser, receiving confirmation of her reflexive deliberations.
Second, many communicative reflexives in the research tend to use social and moral 
norms to understand what causes are worth donating to and volunteering for. Moral dis-
courses, stories and myths provide people with ways to think, shape and reason about 
how to treat and be treated by others, and the communicative reflexives usually accept 
such cultural constructs, rather than contest them. Several communicative reflexives 
give to well-known charities. For example, Paul, a former working-class commercial 
engineer now retired, notes:
For a very long time I’ve been making a regular monthly donation to a few chosen charities. 
The RSPCA [The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals], I see them as the 
umbrella organization for all animal welfare, and I will not give money to any other animal 
charity on a regular basis. I do believe in the work of, like, Compassion in World Farming and 
these charities that look after, you know, old horses and greyhounds and things that – I cannot 
abide cruelty to animals. I also give money on a regular basis to the NSPCC [The National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children], which again I see as an umbrella organization 
for children, I will also give to the Macmillan Nurses and Cancer Research and I consider that 
sufficient. . . . I’d also give, you know, to certain Christmas charities because I think, you know, 
there’s always a tradition in Britain that at Christmas you like to think of people who are not as 
fortunate as you. And when I was a child, when we had our Christmas dinner, my parents, you 
know, would always think of people who were less fortunate than ourselves, because I think it’s 
very important that you do that, you know, at least I think if you’re thinking about people it’s 
better than not thinking about them.
Paul has an emotional connection to causes about animals, children and cancer, 
reflecting the nation’s leading charity causes (see Mohan & Breeze, 2016: 28–32). He 
also donates to several major charities, which he views as umbrella organizations for 
their specific causes. In addition to his regular monthly contributions, Paul gives to sev-
eral Christmas charities. For him, Christmas is an important and traditional time of the 
year to show generosity to needy and vulnerable groups, a message reinforced by his 
early family socialization of the ritual Christmas dinner as an occasion to reflect on less 
fortunate groups. Moral discourses and religious celebrations provide many communica-
tive reflexives with rules to complete and confirm their internal deliberations.
In addition to inner dialogues, communicative reflexives rely on other people’s input 
to effect charitable giving. Family and social reactions to media appeals and street col-
lections can spur individuals to donate, as Jane notes:
When they have the things on the telly like the tsunami, I mean [my daughters] were horrified, 
‘Mummy, Mummy we have got to go and give them some money!’ … [My daughter] was only 
really quite small then and it was horrible that it affected them because you want to protect them 
from that kind of thing in the world. … When it’s in your face and I think it’s easier for 
everybody to give stuff that’s in your face.
Jane’s daughters pleaded with her to donate money after they watched a television 
appeal on the tsunami in Sri Lanka in December 2004. Public attention and pressure also 
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help Jane to respond to ‘in your face’ street collectors and charity telethons. With large 
charities dominating the public space and the media, several communicative reflexives 
in the study support them.
The significance of other people’s participation in the communicative reflexives’ 
deliberations can leave the latter vulnerable to the former’s manipulation and pressure. 
Madeleine recounts how her local Scout group was threatened with closure, and the 
Scout committee persuaded her to become a manager to ensure its survival:
I sort of almost got cornered by the Scout leader and by the Chairperson of the committee who 
said, ‘Well there is no one to run it, so you could run it!’ ‘No, no I just wanna help out,’ I went. 
‘What, run it? No, I wanna help.’ ‘Run it. If you run it, people will help.’ ‘But I think I’m the 
one saying I will help.’ ‘It’s only an hour a week, we’ll all help you. You’ll be alright.’ ‘Will I?’ 
‘Yeah, yeah you will.’ ‘Ohh, I will. Well okay then, I’ll do it.’
Madeline was reluctant to manage the group, but gave in to the committee’s intense 
pressure, in part because she recognized that she and other mothers would benefit from 
its continuation. In general, morality can co-exist with power, since individuals’ self-
interest and moral commitments can be exploited by others to further their own interests 
(Sayer, 2011: 177–179).
In the study, the communicative reflexives are more likely to accommodate them-
selves to prevailing social structures and norms, activating their powers to define their 
social relationships and charitable practices. For instance, while relations of care have 
many positive qualities, they are also strongly gendered, with women undertaking much 
of the burden of care (Tronto, 1994). Several female communicative reflexives’ volun-
teering involves gendered responsibilities of care and support. Madeleine reflects on 
how her maternal guilt moves her to become a ‘super-mum’, providing relief and help to 
other parents at the local Scout group:
I sort of think maybe there are other people going through those kinds of hard times and I would 
like somebody to be able to do that for my children, to be able to give them a good experience 
when I’m having a hard time. So if I can do it for other people’s children, then maybe because 
we have got children that come that obviously don’t always have the happiest of times so just 
for that one hour I can be super-mum or super-leader [at the Scout group].
In discussing their giving, Madeleine and Jane give attention to their own and others’ 
children, partly reflecting how their sentiments and roles are gendered and socially con-
structed. But their giving is also a normative and emotional response to the nature of their 
lives – their fragility, neediness and interdependency. Charitable giving is simultane-
ously an issue of power and morality.
Autonomous reflexives: Instrumentality and moral individualism
Twenty-one interviewees were identified as exercising predominantly autonomous 
reflexivity to a varying degree. Their personal identity centres on career or practical 
worldly outcomes, obtaining personal satisfaction from their performance (Archer, 2007: 
201–204). Most autonomous reflexives prefer to be mobile in order to have a good fit 
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between their personal aspirations and their social context, opportunistically drawing on 
social and cultural resources to achieve their goals. Jackie, a lower-middle-class finan-
cial administrator, switched jobs twice in pursuit of better opportunities and advance-
ments, and now enjoys the strategic decision-making part of her work:
My interest isn’t in real number-crunching, producing accounts and balance sheets and things 
like that, it’s very much more the forward looking, the planning, you know… If we, you know, 
particularly at the university, can assume we’re gonna get this many student numbers, that’ll 
bring in this much income, we’d need to run stuff at these costs, you know, that side of things 
is what interests me, the real sort of more strategic side of it.
Jackie also undertakes extra training and qualifications as she aims to develop her 
career. She wants to become a chartered accountant, and studies in the evenings for her 
professional exams. Many career-minded individuals are quite disciplined in dovetailing 
work with studies, family and friends, finding ways to accommodate different moral 
concerns. Peter, a working-class prison officer and a part-time mature student, deliber-
ately chose The Open University degree, as it helps to fit together different things:
The Open University suits people like me I think, as well as various other people. It’s part-time. 
It suits me. I can listen to a lot of material and learn stuff in the car on the way to work. I can 
take my books into work while I’m supervising prisoners, or I might have a bit of down-time 
on my lunch break, so I can read through that. When I do get home and I’ve got some time, I 
can then type up my assignments. I don’t think it’s a case of seeing anybody less or spending 
less time with people, but I can have my friends over and I can still be studying while they’re 
over because I’m still spending quality time with my friends, although I might be doing other 
things, they’re still around me.
The Open University degree allows Peter to bring his studies into his work and home 
life without damaging his relationships with his employer and partner. Compare Peter’s 
approach to studies with Mary’s: Peter is more dedicated, seizing whatever opportunities 
he can to study.
There are two key interrelated elements of the autonomous reflexives’ charitable giv-
ing. First, it tends to have an instrumental value (see Curtis, 1997). Several autonomous 
reflexives use volunteering to strengthen their curriculum vitae. Peter believes that, when 
the prison service gets restructured in the near future, he may have to look for other 
employment. By volunteering as a special constable, he has a competitive edge over 
other applicants should he apply to join the police:
As a volunteer, you’re getting a background if you like into that before you make the full jump 
into being a police officer – you go through all the assessments and stuff. An average Joe off 
the street going for a job as a police constable, they don’t really know what it’s all about and 
they haven’t got the inside story if you like and they don’t know what’s going on, so it’s a bit 
of a risk, whereas, as a special, you get a bit of a background.
While most interviewees give morally mixed reasons for charitable giving, self- 
interest plays a more decisive role in motivating the autonomous reflexives than for 
the communicative and meta-reflexives. Compare Peter’s reasons for volunteering with 
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Madeleine’s: he clearly elucidates how volunteering will serve his purpose of changing 
careers in the future. Some autonomous reflexives do not feel guilty about using charity 
in instrumental ways, but rather regard themselves as being alert and intelligent in know-
ing how to navigate through the system to get what they want.
Self-interestedness need not necessarily mean selfishness, as individuals can be com-
passionate on the basis of assessing their own vulnerability (Sayer, 2011: 119–124). 
Patrick, a working-class student and a part-time special constable, donates to an ambu-
lance charity in the knowledge that one day he may have to use its life-saving services:
You do feel good about thinking the money you’re giving has potentially, you know, saved 
random people’s lives with regards to Kent Air Ambulance which one day I think, you never 
know, it might save my life. … But you just think, that you know, Kent Air Ambulance is there 
to support anyone and you never know, I might get run over one day on duty, it might come and 
pick me up and take me straight to a specialist hospital and might have saved my life. So I know 
by donating money it might save my life as well instead of other people’s.
Patrick’s donation to the ambulance charity reflects an element of enlightened self-
interest. Should he get injured while on duty, the ambulance service may save his life. 
Several autonomous reflexives in the research contribute to civil society in the belief that 
they will gain from the transaction.
While many autonomous reflexives in the study value independence and privacy, they 
also require support and advice from others to make their way through the world. Some 
of them participate in charities when personal problems arise, drawing on their help and 
knowledge. When Mandy’s son was diagnosed with autism, her relationship with her 
parents became quite strained; she felt that they were unsympathetic and unsupportive. 
In addition, her marriage broke down under the strain of raising an autistic child. Feeling 
very lonely, Mandy, a working-class mature postgraduate student, managed to find some 
relief from her son’s challenging behaviour by volunteering at his school:
I found it therapeutic to be in [the children’s] company of how they should be acting, and 
actually enjoy the day and then I think I was kind of in the right frame of mind to deal with [my 
son’s] challenging behaviour, if that makes sense? I don’t know, but I think that’s why I found 
it enjoyable, is why I kept doing it, and things like, you know, going to assembly and even 
hearing them all sing and I did find it therapeutic… [The] voluntary work I think I was more 
helping myself. I knew I was helping the children because an extra pair of hands [in the 
classroom], and I felt good about having spent a day with them, but I think the main motivator 
probably was the therapy that I kind of felt from doing it.
Unable to properly communicate with her parents and her ex-husband, Mandy viewed 
volunteering as therapy to deal with her personal situation. In addition, she relied on a 
local support group of the National Autistic Society, which she donated to, for advice and 
assistance. But as Mandy became better at coping with her son’s autism, she stopped 
going to the local support group meetings and buying charity cards:
I did support the National Autistic Society with donation and Christmas cards, because it was 
something affecting me and I sort of did do it to try and keep them going because I thought they 
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were really worthwhile. I did support them [when my son was diagnosed with autism], but then 
it kind of went a whole turnabout point where things sort of moved on, [and he] was in school. 
I think last year was the first time I didn’t buy the cards, because I kind of thought I don’t need 
to be sending everyone a card with NAS on it. I kind of felt that in my head I was okay with it.
When her son’s behaviour became manageable, Mandy ended her reciprocal relation-
ship with the charity. Although she remains highly appreciative of its support, she does 
not feel obligated to carry on buying its charity cards, returning to her default position of 
moral individualism.
When charities do not have an instrumental value, some autonomous reflexives have 
spontaneous and ad hoc reflexive deliberations about them. Jackie is candid about her 
lack of reflexivity on the subject:
In all honesty it’s not a massive part of me … I don’t sit and feel, ‘Should I be doing something? 
I’m probably not pulling my weight’, or whatever it might be, if you see what I mean. ‘I could 
be doing more.’ … It’s just very ad hoc and it’s very much, like I say, reactive, as and when I’m 
asked for things I will do it. But it doesn’t matter enough to me, to be going out there, to try and 
find what else I could be doing.
Jackie does not get excited about giving, but will donate when asked to do so. Charity is 
not significant for her. She is much more reflexive about trying to dovetail her career and 
studies with her new family.
Second, many autonomous reflexives get personal satisfaction from their charitable 
performances and achievements. Terry, a former upper-middle-class naval officer now a 
semi-retired business owner, manages a local naval museum that allows former and 
retired naval officers, mechanics and engineers to restore de-commissioned sea vessels 
for public viewing at a local historical dockyard. When the naval dockyard closed down 
because of defence cuts, Terry and other former naval workers volunteered to put their 
skills into use to turn parts of the dockyard into a museum:
[When the dockyard closed] there were all these highly trained mechanics, communication 
specialists, engineers and so on. What do we do? Where do we go? … I saw the admiral, who 
was the chairman of the dockyard trust, and said, ‘We haven’t got a job anymore, do you want 
some of the lads and girls down here?’ He said, ‘Bring them down for volunteering!’ So we had 
about a hundred come in and then they all divvied up into different projects, we started on the 
submarine first of all, got it ready and open to the public, took two years. We had all sorts of 
different things for people to put their skills to – naval skills into other skills, museum-y type 
skills, you know, resurrecting things, restoring craft, ships, small-crafts, a helicopter. Someone 
went into archive work, someone into cataloguing photographs and books.
Terry has a feeling of self-satisfaction in the way the historical dockyard museum 
developed, from his initial proposal to the admiral to his managing ex-naval workers’ 
skills, resulting in retired war vessels being restored for public display. He feels proud of 
what he has accomplished, receiving national awards and honours in recognition of his 
work. Many autonomous reflexives engage with charities on their own terms, taking 
personal pleasure from doing charity and achieving success.
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When personal satisfaction diminishes, most autonomous reflexives stop giving. 
Jimmy, a former lower-middle-class training consultant now retired, compares his chari-
table activities to hobbies that give him intrinsic pleasure, but he would stop doing them 
if they were no longer enjoyable:
It’s a self thing that you feel that you enjoy it, so why give it up if you enjoy it. One thing I 
would say about volunteering is I feel very comfortable about the fact, if I suddenly come to the 
point where I think to myself I’m not enjoying this any more, then I can just say sorry I’m not 
gonna do it any more, finished. I don’t have to give any reasons … I don’t necessarily have to 
feel guilty about it. All the time I feel that I personally enjoy doing it, if it helps somebody else 
along the way, then that’s a bonus, but I’m probably selfish in thinking the reason why I do it is 
because I like doing it, end of story.
Jimmy does not feel he needs to explain his reasons to others, nor does he feel guilty 
about being self-interested, content with his self-contained inner conversations on giving. 
Compare Jimmy’s self-determination and lack of guilt about volunteering to Madeleine’s 
submission and guilt. Moral individualism is a salient feature of many autonomous reflex-
ives’ accounts of charitable giving, expressed in terms of self-responsibility (Peter), self-
interest (Patrick), self-help (Mandy), self-satisfaction (Terry) and self-determination 
(Jimmy). It partly articulates their lay understanding of morality, drawing on available 
cultural resources and scripts, and is shaped by historical and structural conditions, such 
as the ideology of competitive individualism, the neoliberal discourse of the enterprising 
self, working-class aspirations for social betterment and upward social mobility, and mid-
dle-class dispositions towards career advancement and capital accumulation.
Meta-reflexives: Social criticisms and politics
Eight interviewees were identified as predominantly exercising meta-reflexivity to a 
varying degree. The meta-reflexives have a deep commitment to moral, religious and 
political beliefs, and have a strong sense of compassion and social justice (Archer, 2007: 
261–265). Some of them challenge specific social arrangements that are incongruent 
with their values, aspiring to lead a complete ethical life. Sophie, a lower-middle-class 
researcher, is passionate about protecting the eco-system, abhorring its abuse:
I just feel that my purpose on this planet is to help and protect animals and every day when I 
leave for work to catch a bus, if it’s been raining all the worms are up on the ground and I can’t 
walk by and step over them or whatever. I move every single worm, every single slug and snail 
that I see along the road as I get to the bus stop. . . . And as far as I’m concerned if it’s living, then 
it has a right to live and we don’t have the right to kill it. I will rescue anything I can to give it 
the opportunity to live. [In my local supermarket], I’ve got a whole campaign, in fact they dread 
me coming in now, because they are failing to water their plants regularly. So when I go in, I 
insist on the manager coming, pointing out which ones want watering … I just feel that God has 
put me on this planet to sort of protect animals and to some degree plants and stuff like that.
Sophie has intense reflexive deliberations about animal welfare and plant life. 
Although she is withdrawn and reticent in work and social situations, she is quite 
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forthright and confident in helping animals and plants, going to extraordinary lengths to 
intervene on behalf of non-human living things, in the belief that it is her ‘calling’. In the 
past she has rescued various animals from neglect and harm, and has started a local cam-
paign to stop developers from destroying primroses and wild orchids, and chopping 
down trees. She also refuses to donate to specific charities that experiment on animals.
Some meta-reflexives are deeply reflexive about major social and political issues (e.g. 
homelessness and the environment) and personal matters. William, an upper-middle-
class lecturer, agonizes over the ethics of his undeclared income:
I have some additional income from various little bits and bobs, things like teaching piano 
lessons and so on, and you know, part of me thinks, it would be very easy, I get paid in cash, 
you know just have this little bit of extra income, not to mention it to the tax people and so on, 
and obviously then it’s a moral question of, ‘Do you alert the tax people to what is a 
comparatively modest part of your income and thereby see 20 per cent of it disappear again?’ 
… I debate the issues and say, you know, ‘What do I want to do here? What is the right thing to 
do? Does it matter?’
William embarks on a lengthy internal conversation, mulling over his ethical dilemma. 
He also describes another inner dialogue about the cost of shopping for ethical and 
organic products.
While religious faith is an important reference for several meta-reflexives, it usually 
amalgamates with political and moral discourses to shape their values and beliefs. 
For instance, Sophie’s worldview consists of conservative Christianity and veganism, 
for William it’s liberal Christianity and environmentalism, for Kamela liberal 
Christianity and egalitarianism, and for Geraldine liberal Christianity and anarchism. 
Some meta-reflexives are atheists and draw on secular discourses, such as humanism 
and liberalism.
There are two key interrelated elements in the meta-reflexives’ charitable giving. 
First, charitable giving is likely to be viewed as a matter of compassion and social jus-
tice. Eve, a working-class part-time hospital porter, gives to Shelter, a homeless charity, 
because homeless people are vulnerable and blameless for their situation:
For example, a single mother with three children whose other half batters her. She will have to 
go and get temporary housing to be housed away from him and then she’ll be left in there for 
two year. That’s not her fault. … That’s just a bad situation, bad circumstances, bad luck really 
and a lot of the people who are homeless, it’s just bad luck that’s befallen them and so they need 
help really and the government doesn’t help them and they fall through the net, so and it’s sad 
and not enough people really care about it as far as I can see. There’s too much of this, kind of, 
it’s their own fault sort of idea.
She has sympathy for homeless people, having been homeless herself. It is common 
for most donors to sympathize with others who have suffered misfortunate or injustice, 
having experienced or imagined similar or related forms of suffering. But the meta-
reflexives tend to point out that social institutions are partly responsible for social prob-
lems. Eve is angry that the government does not provide sufficient temporary and 
emergency accommodation. She is also critical of the way the media often blame 
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homeless people for their own plight without understanding how bad luck affects their 
lives, some coming from broken and abusive homes for example.
Of course, recognition of injustice and suffering can come from political and moral 
beliefs as well as from personal experience. Several meta-reflexives have intense reflec-
tions on what values should guide them and society (Archer, 2003: 288–295). Kamela, 
an upper-middle-class information technology manager, volunteers for the Independent 
Monitoring Board, which protects prisoners’ rights. She is critical of how the prison 
system unfairly treats prisoners:
I suppose prisoners are not popular are they, you know, it’s very difficult to get sympathy for 
prisoners, yeah I find it so frustrating when people moan about that fact that they have TVs in 
their cells, like a four star hotel. … [Prisoners] obviously have rights taken away from them, 
that’s why they’re in prison, but in terms of being treated with respect and humanely they have, 
you know, the same rights as any of us, and if me going in there ensures that happens, that they 
get treated humanely, and with respect, then that’s worth it. If they are being treated humanely 
and with respect while they are inside prison gives them the opportunity to turn their lives 
around when they come out because they are given some sense of worth because of their 
treatment, then that has to be a real plus.
Kamela has strong views on equal rights and human dignity, and believes that prison-
ers should be treated humanely and with respect. She ensures that prison rules are cor-
rectly followed, and that prisoners are given ample opportunities and encouragement to 
lead a better life once they are released. She is scornful of attempts by right-wing politi-
cians and the media to hinder humane penal reforms.
Some meta-reflexives have a strong sense of moral obligation verging on supereroga-
tion that involves significant personal sacrifices. Eve’s donations to Shelter mean that 
she struggles to pay her local council tax and utility bills, but nevertheless she feels 
comparatively well-off:
I am passionate about Shelter yeah. I know that there are people out there that are worse off than 
me … I guess people who are in sort of privileged positions, i.e. have a house, have good 
education, have enough to get by on, have a job, have money and generally happy, it’s really 
kind of our responsibility that other people do have, who aren’t as fortunate, that they can have 
some kind of happiness.
Feeling relatively privileged, Eve makes monthly donations to the homeless charity 
and tithes to her local church, which uses some of its income to manage an accommoda-
tion centre for the homeless. When walking down the street at night, she often stops to 
talk and give cigarettes to people sleeping out, some of whom she knows from her own 
turbulent past. Although her partner gets upset that she makes excessive contributions 
when they do not have enough food on the table or enough money to heat the house, she 
feels duty-bound to tithe and make donations, and usually gives cigarettes to the home-
less without her partner’s knowledge.
Second, in criticizing existing social institutions, most meta-reflexives have a differ-
ent vision of society, and generosity plays a significant role in creating a fairer society, 
fostering values of human interdependence, obligations and well-being (see Smith & 
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Davidson, 2014: 53–86). Kamela believes that, although generosity can have some nega-
tive results, it is better than being cynical:
Sometimes you have to give first, and sometimes you have to give and get kicked in the face 
for doing it and still give … I’d still rather carry on being that than being cynical and bitter, 
because that not only affects everybody else around me and their quality of life if I’m cynical 
and bitter, but it sure as hell affects mine, you know, my outlook on life … Because no man’s 
an island. You know we’re all interconnected, and most of us wanna go through life with people 
being nice to us, and not being sort of cynical and thinking ‘Oh, I’m alright Jack!’
For Kamela, individuals are interdependent and needy beings, who have to rely on 
others for love, care and support. She suggests that an excessive focus on the self and the 
family can threaten social solidarity and human well-being, and laments how people’s 
lives are often sacrificed for profits:
We’re not gonna have the best society we can, unless people are prepared to give … We went a 
lot wrong in our society in the Thatcher years, when everybody thought it was okay to make 
lots of money and ‘I’m alright Jack, and stuff you!’, and what does it matter if I make a fortune 
on the back of three million unemployed, you know, I’m okay, my family’s okay. You know, it 
really annoys me when people say ‘Charity begins at home.’ What you mean just within that 
four walls, you know, what is home? Home’s big? You know, I believe in communities, I 
believe in church communities, school communities, you know, guides and cubs and that sort 
of thing … So I just think we’re a poorer society if we don’t give.
Kamela’s charitable giving is framed in terms of communal and collective values. 
Whereas many autonomous reflexives (such as Patrick and Mandy) view giving in per-
sonal and strategic terms, Kamela highlights its social transformative effects. She feels 
that there are not enough people donating and volunteering, because they are too indi-
vidualistic and materialistic. She regularly donates money to her parish church, and helps 
with fundraising activities at her local school and church fêtes.
Some meta-reflexives undertake active roles in civil society, hoping to change social 
relationships and institutions to ensure a better treatment of disadvantaged communities. 
But when their goals have been satisfied or their ideals are no longer compatible with their 
charities, they leave for another charity. Geraldine, a lower-middle-class mature student, 
was influential in starting up a self-advocacy group for people with learning disabilities in 
her local community. The group was successful, expanding its membership and winning 
local council grants to run training programmes. But after two years, Geraldine had 
achieved her goal of empowering the group members and had nothing more to offer:
[We were] supporting people with illiteracy, supporting people with having the confidence to 
speak in front of people, supporting people to learn things like how do you run a meeting, and 
what sort of behaviours are appropriate when you go in a big meeting and, for example, going 
up to London, supporting people on the Tube because that’s something that they couldn’t 
necessarily do. And also at the same time, doing yourself out of a job. The main thing you have 
to do is know what the ideal is. At the end of two years, they don’t really need you. And I don’t 
know whether the project director who runs the group would agree or not, but I thought we got 
there at the end of last year. That they really didn’t need a supporter/carer any more.
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At the start Geraldine was delighted with her role as a supporter and carer within the 
group, empowering and meeting the needs of the group. After a couple of years, she felt 
that her goals were accomplished, and left the organization. Compare her reason for leav-
ing the charity with Mandy’s – Geraldine doubted that she could make any further mean-
ingful contribution to the charity. She now volunteers for Médecins Sans Frontières, 
which she praises because it provides medical assistance to people living in dangerous 
places and is critical of foreign governments.
Addressing some criticisms
Some readers may be dissatisfied with the three-stage model of reflexive donors and 
volunteers, criticizing the model for: (1) neglecting to say how social and cultural struc-
tures can shape, or correlate with, the different modes of reflexivity; (2) failing to con-
textualize reflexive deliberations in different social settings; (3) exaggerating the role of 
reflexivity in daily life and underestimating the influence of socialization, dispositions 
and habits; and (4) ignoring the messiness and complexity of social life by neatly fitting 
interviewees into Archer’s ideal-types. I will briefly address each of these criticisms.
First, in this article, the different modes of reflexivity are analysed as causes of 
specific courses of action, and the article does not examine the effects of social and 
cultural structures on reflexivity. The three-stage model of reflexive donors maintains 
that the modes cannot be reduced to social factors, but rather emerge from social and 
psychological processes that have their own distinct properties and powers. In propos-
ing the model, I highlight how reflexivity is an important and neglected dimension of 
social and charitable practices, while noting that social factors (like gender, class and 
discourses) are also relevant.
It is tempting to correlate the working class with communicative reflexives, the lower 
middle class with autonomous reflexives, and the upper middle class with meta-reflex-
ives. It also seems plausible that class can shape reflexivity, with the working class more 
likely to accommodate and resign themselves to existing social structures and, lacking 
cultural and social capital, likely to occupy passive roles in civil society. In contrast, the 
middle class are more likely to have the economic and cultural resources to articulate 
social criticisms and to fill commanding roles in charitable organizations to envision 
social change. It is also tempting to suggest that gender can shape reflexivity, with 
women more likely to be communicative or meta-reflexives because they undertake care 
roles and responsibilities in the family and community, and are sympathetic and attentive 
to suffering. In contrast, men are likely to be autonomous reflexives because they are 
more individualistic and focused on achievements, and have more distant and instrumen-
tal relationships. But reflexivity cannot be reduced to social structures because it emerges 
from social and psychological processes, and has distinct properties and powers from 
structure and agency. While knowing people’s social position can be a good indicator of 
likely behaviour, it is never enough to give a complete understanding of how they inter-
pret their situation in relation to their concerns – this requires an account of their reflex-
ivity. Without reflexivity, people lack the capacity to deliberate, evaluate and change 
their circumstances. Ironically, in Bourdieu et al.’s (1999) The Weight of the World, the 
interviewees discuss and evaluate the legitimacy of their situations and the dominant 
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discourses about them. Sayer (2005: 27–30) argues that accounts of social practices need 
to recognize both the scope of unreflective practical action and the role of conscious 
monitoring and deliberation in everyday life.
Second, although the article focuses on the interviewees’ dominant mode of reflexiv-
ity, it does acknowledge that they can also engage in other modes. They can have intense 
and critical reflexive deliberations in certain social situations, fleeting and spontaneous 
ones in some, and act unconsciously in others. The article analyses how they have differ-
ent modes of reflexivity about charitable giving, rather than exploring their reflexive 
deliberations and habits across different social contexts.
Third, the model recognizes that it is not always necessary for people to discursively 
articulate and justify their actions or to possess a penetrating discursive understanding of 
their situations; all they need to recognize consciously and find good is the ease and flu-
ency of their actions. Furthermore we may be suspicious of individuals who always 
intensely deliberate before acting; love, care and professionalism are valued partly 
because they are spontaneous and stable. In addition, the article does discuss the different 
ways in which socialization, power and ideology can shape charitable giving, noting the 
effects of gendered roles and moral individualism on giving.
Fourth, it is incorrect to say that the data merely fit into Archer’s analysis. Contrary to 
her expectations, the research found that all but one of the reflexive groups are involved 
in charities. This partly reflects the point noted above, that the differences among the 
three groups often lie in degrees rather than in kind, and that there are some important 
similarities among them. Furthermore, in explaining charitable giving, the article recog-
nizes the need for both conscious monitoring and socialization.
Conclusion
I have examined how charitable giving has different meanings and significance for the 
three groups of reflexive donors and volunteers. For many interviewees who largely 
exercise communicative reflexivity, charities give them an opportunity to do good work 
with and for others, some of whom are significant figures in their lives. Giving is seen as 
a communal activity that establishes and affirms social connections and norms. For most 
participants with predominantly autonomous reflexivity, charities are useful for achiev-
ing practical things that matter for their well-being. Moral individualism is a salient 
feature of their deliberations about giving. For several interviewees exercising largely 
meta-reflexivity, charitable giving is about making society more humane and fair by 
addressing social problems and issues. Giving is viewed as helping to create a different 
world based on human dignity and respect.
But the study also found that the three groups share some important elements that 
shape their charitable giving. These include the capacity to sympathize and understand 
others’ suffering and misfortunes, mixed sentiments of self-interest, compassion and jus-
tice, and moral discourses and rules. The differences among the three groups often lie in 
degrees rather than in kind. For instance, while instrumentality and reciprocity strongly 
influence most of the autonomous reflexives’ decisions about charities, they also affect 
other groups’ deliberations. Sociality and conventions are significant in explaining 
many of the communicative reflexives’ giving practices, but are also present in the 
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deliberations of most autonomous reflexives and meta-reflexives. For almost all the 
meta-reflexives, giving reflects their desire and longing for a different world, sentiments 
that are also shared with many communicative and autonomous reflexives. It is worth 
repeating that most people engage in one or more modes of reflexivity over the course of 
their lives, though one of them tends to be dominant at any particular stage. Although the 
dominant mode is likely to be stable, it is not fixed, because it changes in response to 
social and personal dynamics, including illness, children leaving home, divorce, educa-
tion and unemployment.
Finally, the study rejected the standard two-stage model of structure and agency, argu-
ing that much of contemporary sociology tends to conflate the distinct structural and 
agential properties and powers. This often produces reductionist (and cynical) accounts 
of social practices that usually deny people’s capacity to evaluate and change either 
themselves or their circumstances. Instead, the article offers the three-stage model, in 
which internal conversations mediate the impact social structures have on agents’ con-
cerns, and condition individual responses to particular social situations. This offers a 
better understanding of how individuals interpret their situation in relation to their con-
cerns. In explaining everyday practices, however, accounts need to recognize both delib-
erations and unreflexive practical action.
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